The dynamics of borrower reputation following financial misreporting

October 2018 | Johnson, Shane A.

Firms that misreport financial information pay greater spreads on new bank loans for at least six years following restatement of the misreported information, whether benchmarked against their pre-restatement loans or similar loans of matched non-misreporting firms. Misreporting firms are more likely to replace their CEOs and CFOs than are matched firms, but even firms that replace these executives pay greater spreads for at least six years. There is some suggestive evidence that firms that promptly replace the chairs of their audit committees or their external auditors see their loan spreads fall to benchmark levels within three years of restating, but a large majority of misreporting firms do not promptly replace these parties and pay significantly greater spreads for at least six years following their restatements. The results suggest that misreporting causes a long-lasting and costly reputation loss that firms find difficult to restore.

Author

Co-author(s)

  • Sudheer Chava
  • Kershen Huang

Publication(s)

Management Science

Web Link

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2739